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The puzzle of heterogeneity in support 
for free trade
Abstract: Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and 
mostly unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free 
or freer trade: according to aggregate results from many surveys, women tend 
to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men. Positing an 
economic security explanation based largely on a mobile factors approach, we 
ask if it is women generally who are more negative toward trade or rather women 
who are more economically vulnerable – i.e., women from the scarce labor factor. 
We utilize data from two recent surveys on individuals’ attitudes toward different 
facets of trade and its effects to examine this hypothesis empirically. Rejecting 
a monolithic definition of “women,” we find that disaggregating by education 
level illuminates to some extent what underlying characteristics might be helping 
to drive some of these findings. Lower-skilled women in the US are much less 
likely to support free trade compared to higher-skilled women and this may 
largely explain previous negative findings.  The low versus high-skill dynamic is, 
however, much less clear in the findings using survey data from a small sample 
of developing countries.
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1  Introduction
Over time and across countries, researchers have noted frequent and mostly 
unexplained gender differences in the levels of support for policies of free or freer 
trade: women tend to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than 
men.1 Because citizens can and often influence the making of this vital macroeco-
*Corresponding author: Abdur Chowdhury, Department of Economics, Marquette University, 
606 North 13th Street, Milwaukee, WI, USA, e-mail: abdur.chowdhury@marquette.edu
Jeffrey Drope: American Cancer Society, Atlanta, GA, USA; and Department of Political Science, 
Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA
1 For example, Seligson (1999); Graham and Pettinato (2001); O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001); 
 Scheve and Slaughter (2001); Baker (2005, 2009); Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
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nomic policy, and women comprise  > 50% of the population in most countries, 
women’s possibly distinct preferences in this major policy area are an important 
phenomenon to consider. While earlier studies have posited multiple explana-
tions for general attitudes toward trade policy, no well-substantiated account of 
the gender component of trade attitudes has emerged.2
While this research seeks to address all of the above approaches in order to 
explain gender differences in trade attitudes, it posits the concept of labor mobil-
ity as a reasonable theoretical starting point, but with a gender twist. We hypoth-
esize that it is not women in general who tend to be negative toward trade but 
particularly women in the less abundant labor factor – higher or lower-skilled 
depending on the country context – who have heightened concerns about open 
trade’s negative effects on them. In particular, these individuals tend to be more 
concerned about the potentially disruptive economic effects that such policies 
might have on them or their families.
One of the central obstacles to testing theoretical propositions related to 
explaining trade policy attitudes has been the limitations of the available data. 
Most public opinion surveys ask respondents to provide only a general opinion 
about free trade, and researchers are left to conjecture as to which particular 
aspect(s) of trade policy and/or its effects the respondent is reacting.3 Trade is 
complex and few surveys ask questions about its meaningful components, a 
shortcoming that poses serious problems for direct testing of many key hypoth-
eses. Trade, and more importantly, changes in trade policy, can have a number 
2 The few studies focusing specifically on the gender-trade attitudes nexus underscore exposure 
to economic ideas (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004) and consumption decisions (Hall, Kao, and Nel-
son 1998), while those examining general attitudes toward trade have employed not only these 
two approaches (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Baker 2009), but have also emphasized 
more traditional mobile factors (Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and specific factors (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005) approaches, in addition to considering education as human capital (Gabel 1998) 
and sociotropic concerns (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).
3 The following surveys include general questions about attitudes toward trade or trade policy: 
the American National Election Study or NES 1992 (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Blonigen 2009); 
Globescan International Survey 2003 (Baker 2009); International Social Survey Program or ISSP 
1995 (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Mayda and Rodrik 2005); Knowledge Networks 2007 (Mans-
field and Mutz 2009); Latinobarometro 1996 (Beaulieu, Yatawara, and Wang 2005), 1997 (Baker 
2009); the National Annenberg Election Study 2004 (Mansfield and Mutz 2009); Pew Global At-
titudes Project 2002, 2007 (Baker 2009); Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences or 
TESS 2003 (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004); the Wall Street Journal Americas 1998 (Baker 2009); the 
World Values Survey 1990–1992, 1995–1997, 1999–2001 (Baker 2005, 2009; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, 
and Ceccoli 2004; used 1995–1997 only). Baker (2009: Ch. 8) utilizes some questions from his 
4-City Survey (Brazil – 2005) about particular aspects of trade but uses them to create an index 
and explore a different theoretical inquiry.
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of major implications for individuals and societies, and respondents are likely 
to be more concerned about the particular aspects that most affect them or their 
household, including, e.g., trade’s effects on consumption, jobs (theirs and/or 
employment more broadly) and economic growth. These specific concerns are 
the components shaping the “general” attitudes upon which most researchers 
focus. Specific to this inquiry, the existing literature suggests that there may be 
a gendered component to many of these aspects, including those related to eco-
nomic security and possibly consumption.
Ideally, in order to determine more effectively why women may be generally 
less receptive to trade liberalization, survey questions need to ask directly about 
the specific aspects and/or effects of trade policy that might be affecting women 
differently. Such data are even better if they are collected across space and time. 
Researchers can then employ these more nuanced responses as dependent 
variables in order to test competing or complementary theoretical propositions 
more meaningfully. Exploring gender differences in individuals’ wide-ranging 
concerns about trade’s effects on different facets of economic security helps to 
ensure that the findings are robust. The breadth of questions might also help to 
disentangle the effects of major causal and/or other important variables that are 
otherwise lumped together in the general questions.
Two recent major public opinion surveys – the first on the US and the second 
on five countries with predominant or large Muslim populations – offer an excel-
lent opportunity to explore some of these complexities because they probe deeply 
and widely into individuals’ perceptions of and attitudes toward trade and its 
effects. Survey themes emphasize economic concerns – e.g., jobs, overall eco-
nomic growth, markets for exports, employment, and pocketbook economic 
concerns and consumption – while also collecting other crucial individual-level 
data such as educational attainment. A multi-country and region research design 
serves to examine possible divergence in gender’s effects on trade attitudes 
between developed and developing countries, thereby helping to test a mobile 
factors theory more effectively.
The empirical findings of this research suggest that a mobile factors approach 
is a useful theoretical starting point in an explanation of gender differences in 
trade attitudes, at least in one major developed economy, the US. In the US, less 
educated women are more likely to have negative attitudes toward international 
trade and many things that it affects including consumption, workers, business, 
the overall economy and the individual-level “pocketbook” concerns. In contrast, 
women with higher levels of formal education in the US are more likely to report 
that trade has positive effects on the country’s workers and consumption. The 
results from the developing country survey are much less clear. Notably, there 
appears to be little evidence of a divide between less and more educated women 
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in the Muslim-country survey. Though the logistic regression results preliminarily 
suggest a weak negative relationship between educated women and free trade, a 
more sophisticated empirical analysis suggests that the logistic results provide 
incomplete information that is likely affecting any inference. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and devel-
ops the theoretical framework. Data and the methodology are given in Section 3, 
while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Alternative explanations are dis-
cussed in Section 5, and the paper ends with concluding remarks in Section 6.
2  Literature and theoretical framework
The existing literature on trade policy attitudes has empirically established that 
a number of theoretical approaches offer explanatory utility. Recognizing this 
utility, and because there are no compelling reasons that these explanations need 
to be theoretically or empirically exclusive of each other, we employ a framework 
that seeks to integrate them. However, because the literature on trade attitudes 
has grown somewhat vast, we will focus in this section on the approaches that 
have been most directly associated with gender and/or are most germane to our 
broader argument, including economic security, consumption, education/knowl-
edge and risk.
2.1  A mobile factors approach and economic security
A major component of economic security is labor mobility. In a mobile factors 
approach to explaining trade attitudes, individuals in the abundant labor factor 
– higher-skilled in developed countries and lower-skilled in developing countries 
– are more likely to prefer policies of freer trade because they are theoretically 
better positioned to thrive in a more liberalized economy.4 Researchers argue that 
the goods or services generated by the abundant labor factor are comparatively 
more competitive in the global marketplace, which garners those workers higher 
wages. The corollary suggests that individuals in the scarce factor – lower-skilled 
in developed countries and higher-skilled in developing countries – will be more 
4 In an analysis of the relationship between trade policy and inequality, Dutt and Mitra (2002) 
also employ a framework consistent with a mobile factors approach. Though gender and 
 inequality are of course distinct concepts, the multi-purpose nature of the general framework 
illustrates its broad utility.
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skeptical of liberalized trade because their industry will not do as well thereby 
mitigating demand for their skills and driving down their wages.5
We suggest the possibility that the scarce-factor dynamic is particularly 
heightened for women because they potentially face even greater economic and 
workforce constraints than men and stand potentially to lose more from poli-
cies that may cause economic distortion or dislocation. Many researchers have 
noted and some have demonstrated empirically that women often bear a dis-
proportionate economic burden after liberalization.6 The broader literature on 
gender-related labor issues has highlighted a number of potential challenges 
that women are more likely to face than men in the labor marketplace, including 
among others: a higher likelihood of part-time work, which is generally much less 
secure than full-time work; a greater probability of leaving the paid workforce at 
different points to provide care (children or others); fewer years of experience to 
secure promotions and new positions (a consequence often of the previous two 
challenges); and blatant gender discrimination. The literature on gender effects 
of economic reform makes the connection that these types of challenges are often 
heightened when economic conditions change, such as when countries liberal-
ize. Therefore, women in the scarce labor factor face a veritable double burden: 
both their gender and their skill set might limit their economic opportunities. It is 
reasonable therefore to expect that these women might tend to be more skeptical 
of economic policy changes that present potential uncertainty to their already 
more precarious economic status, including trade liberalization.
Accordingly, we should be able to observe clear evidence of predictable dif-
ferences among more and less educated women in both developed and less devel-
oped economies. In developed economies, women with more formal education, 
by virtue of being the abundant labor factor, should enjoy greater labor market 
flexibility and opportunity and be more positive toward different facets of trade. 
Also, in developed economies such as the US, less educated women are generally 
more economically vulnerable and may demonstrate wide-ranging and deeper 
concerns about liberalizing trade. Kucera and Milberg demonstrate empirically 
that in the higher-skilled Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries, trade with countries with abundant lower-skilled labor 
has had a disproportionate negative effect on lower-skilled female workers in 
these more developed economies.7
5 For in-depth general discussions of these approaches, see Baker (2009); and Mansfield and 
Mutz (2009).
6 See, e.g., School of International and Public Affairs (2001) and Tickner (2001).
7 Kucera and Milberg (2000).
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In developing countries, higher-skilled skilled workers are not only the scarce 
labor factor, but higher-skilled women in particular in many circumstances are 
newer to and a minority in the workforce (compared not only to men in their 
countries, but also compared to educated women’s relative positions in developed 
economies), and may be the first to feel negative effects as labor demands change. 
Empirically, the ILO finds precisely this negative dynamic across a wide range 
of developing countries and regions: educated women are consistently facing 
lower wages, losing their jobs and not finding work disproportionate to educated 
men.8 Thus, policies such as free trade that can generate significant economic 
change may be more likely to be viewed with skepticism and even negativity by 
these women. Finally, theory also suggests that less educated women in develop-
ing countries will be more likely to endorse freer trade. Recent empirical studies 
demonstrate that in the post-liberalization environment, wage gains for women 
in developing countries have accrued disproportionately to the lower-skilled.9 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that they might look at trade more positively 
than their better-educated compatriots. However, this expectation should also 
be tempered with the complex economic reality that while lower-skilled women 
might be doing better than before economic opening, many studies show that 
trade liberalization generates winners and losers as labor is reallocated accord-
ing to factor endowments and some groups of low-skilled women have also fared 
poorly.10
Kaltenthaler et al. and Seligson have shown that another component of the 
mobile factors approach is individuals’ direct economic pocketbook concerns, 
because these concerns are closely associated with wages and consumption, and 
thus economic security of the individual and their household.11 Though studies 
have found only occasional evidence that these concerns drive individual-level 
attitudes toward trade, women may feel these microeconomic pressures more 
acutely than men. In recent decades, women have been taking an increasingly 
direct household management role in both developed and developing countries, 
and pocketbook concerns may now be more important to many women because 
of these significant role changes.12
Changes in trade policy might affect individual-level consumption and thus 
their broader economic situation. Baker argues that perceptions of improved 
8 International Labor Organization (2010). It is important to note that mobile factors approaches 
assume full employment, which in strict terms, limits the theory to anticipating only wage de-
creases.
9 See, for example, Kabeer (2000), Saavedra (2001) and Mathew (2006).
10 See, Artecona and Cunningham (2002).
11 Seligson (1999); Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli (2004).
12 See Varley (1996).
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consumption opportunities as a result of more open trade help to drive more 
positive attitudes toward liberalized trade.13 It is possible that women – generally 
highly active in household-level purchasing – more strongly consider policies 
that potentially affect consumption. A recent survey, reported by the Boston Con-
sulting Group, of 12,000 women in 21 countries estimates that women are respon-
sible for nearly two-thirds of purchasing worldwide.14 With an increasing number 
of women heading households, perhaps especially so in developing countries, 
this proportion of purchasing will likely continue to increase.15 Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to anticipate that women’s perceptions of the effects of trade policy 
on consumption – including the price, quality and variety of consumer goods 
– may directly affect their policy attitudes. Note that following this logic, women 
should be more supportive of open trade because of these positive effects on 
consumption.
In a similar vein, Hall, Kao, and Nelson examine the historical relationship 
between female political influence and trade policy utilizing a logic that suggests 
that women have more of a consumption-based perception of trade policy and 
are going to be more in favor of liberalized trade because tariffs increase prices.16 
Comparing US tariff levels before and after women’s enfranchisement, they find 
a gender gap wherein policy became more open – at least in terms of tariff levels 
– after this systemic change in voter eligibility, though they note the large number 
of possible conflicting or complementary explanations. In essence, the research-
ers are suggesting that women are more likely to condition their votes on changes 
in prices, while men tend to emphasize wages. The research, however, does not 
explicitly consider the interaction of gender and education.
Women’s central interest in consumption presents at least two related theo-
retical possibilities. First, because women across education and income groups 
are generally active in household purchasing, the perceived consumptive benefits 
from trade might cause all women to look more favorably on this aspect of open 
trade (or even tilt general attitudes of women more positively toward open and/
or international trade). Or second, women with more limited means – indicated 
best by lower levels of education and/or income – might be more sensitive to their 
purchasing power because necessary items comprise such a large proportion of 
their typical basket of goods.17 Thus, women with lower levels of education and/
13 Baker (2003, 2009).
14 Boston Consulting Group (2008).
15 Varley (1996) argues that women-led households are in fact dramatically undercounted be-
cause the convention has been to count only single-female-parent with dependents as “woman-
led.”
16 Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998).
17 See, e.g., Booth et al. (1993).
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or income will be more supportive of open trade because of its positive effects on 
consumption (and their purchasing power relative to their purchasing power pre-
liberalization). Since both surveys query respondents directly about how they 
think trade and/or trade policy is affecting their consumption, it is possible to 
examine this relationship directly.
2.2  Sociotropic
Somewhat outside of the mobile factors framework, some scholars suggest 
that perceptions of the macroeconomic or “sociotropic” environment, includ-
ing overall economic growth and/or broader employment opportunities in the 
general economy, have an effect on attitudes toward trade. For example, Mans-
field and Mutz find that in the US, regardless of gender, respondents’ sociotropic 
concerns have a resounding impact on their attitudes toward trade: people who 
view the economy positively are more supportive of open trade.18 In developing 
countries, where there is ample evidence that trade can disproportionately affect 
vulnerable segments of the population under certain circumstances, it is reason-
able to expect individuals to demonstrate concern about trade’s macroeconomic 
effects. But the theoretical expectations are complex and not well developed. 
For example, it is challenging to disentangle individuals’ perceptions of their 
pocketbook concerns from sociotropic ones because it is not clear that people 
can make these distinctions clearly. Is it reasonable to expect that an individual 
would support free trade if it is working well for the broader economy but not 
for them individually? Finally, there are no clear expectations for specific gender 
implications.
2.3  Ideas and education
Scholars have also focused on exposure to ideas and information about the eco-
nomic principles of trade, as well as on education more generally, in order to 
explain trade attitudes. Hiscox and Hainmueller argue that the actual ideas that 
people learn are important in terms of shaping their attitudes toward trade.19 
They posit that the fairly consistent positive relationship between education and 
support for free trade in developed countries that scholars have found is more 
a function of educated people’s exposure to specific economic ideas. Burgoon 
18 Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
19 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
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and Hiscox’s version of this basic argument includes a gender twist by suggesting 
that the gap between men and women is mainly a difference in their exposure 
to economic ideas.20 The authors argue that men are more likely to be exposed 
to ideas that support freer trade such as comparative advantage – e.g., by being 
more likely to take a college economics class – and therefore will be more likely 
to prefer policies that correspond to these ideas. They test their hypothesis using 
data from the US and find that incorporating knowledge of trade issues (or suit-
able proxies) considerably closes the gender gap even after controlling for alter-
native explanations including those more focused on mobility and consumption.
The logic of the “ideas” hypothesis is extremely challenging to test because it 
is necessary to know the actual ideas to which individuals have been exposed. One 
crude possibility is that college-educated women have generally been exposed to 
more economic ideas than women without a college education because of the 
relative sophistication of the subject material compared to other educational 
experiences (e.g., high school or vocational institutions), and they will therefore 
be more positive toward trade. Some important shortcomings of this claim are 
discussed in greater detail below.
The human capital explanation interprets the role of education differently 
than the “ideas” approach. Scholars who privilege the importance of human 
capital argue that no matter the context, people with more education are better 
poised in the labor market and will be more supportive of general social welfare-
maximizing policies such as liberalized trade.21 Thus, regardless of their status in 
terms of factor abundance and/or the economic ideas to which they have been 
exposed, more educated people – including women – should be more supportive 
of liberalizing trade.
In the cases of both the ideas and human capital, a clear pattern should 
emerge across the data and corresponding analyses below. If either or both are 
helping to explain some of the variation – and we will not be able to discern 
which with these data – we should observe consistently that better educated 
women support open trade (in any country).
2.4  Risk preferences
A strand of the economics literature examining why men and women often make 
different economic decisions privileges the role of risk. In particular, studies cite 
the possible gender effects of emotions, overconfidence, and interpretations of 
20 Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
21 See, e.g., Gabel (1998).
DEGRUYTER 
462      Jeffrey Drope and Abdur Chowdhury
risk as threat or a challenge; some have argued that women tend to be more emo-
tional and less “overconfident” than men and are more likely to interpret risk as 
a threat.22 Because economic liberalization by nature entails some, if not signifi-
cant, risk, this logic could be used as a theoretical starting point to understand 
preferences toward changes in trade policy.
While we cannot test these propositions directly – in fact, most of this litera-
ture is based on controlled laboratory experiments – we can predict the general 
results that we should observe if this logic is suitable in helping to explain trade 
preferences. If women by “nature” are simply more emotional, less overconfident 
and see risk as a threat, there should be systematic evidence of women, ceteris 
paribus, being more likely to reject the riskiness of a potentially changed eco-
nomic context – i.e., liberalized trade – no matter their status in terms of factor 
endowments (and/or other variables). To further complicate this proposition, 
however, Atkinson et al. have found that education and knowledge can attenu-
ate gender differences in economic decisions.23 If this is the case, then we should 
see clear evidence of educated and/or trade-knowledgeable women more likely to 
support trade liberalization.
2.5  Specific factors
Finally, a specific factors approach suggests that the individual’s industry strongly 
influences trade policy preferences: individuals in export-oriented sectors are 
more likely to support open trade while those in import-competing sectors prefer 
more closed trade policies.24 In a recent working paper, Beaulieu and Napier test a 
specific factors hypothesis and a related tradables versus non-tradables hypoth-
esis and find that neither sectoral differences in employment nor employment 
in a tradable versus a non-tradable sector helps to explain gender differences 
in attitudes toward trade.25 They do find, however, that the gender gap is more 
pronounced in developed economies than in developing ones, but do not offer an 
explanation as to why. They conclude in part that the lack of a clear explanation 
of the gender gap in attitudes may be due to immeasurable differences between 
the attributes of males and females. Unfortunately, we were unable to find appro-
priate survey data to test this hypothesis meaningfully.
22 See Crosson and Gneezy (2009) for a review.
23 Atkinson, Baird, and Frye (2003).
24 See Mayda and Rodrik (2005).
25 Beaulieu and Napier (2008).
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3  Data and methodology
3.1  Data
The data are drawn from two recent public opinion surveys. The first survey 
was administered in the US while the second was conducted in five countries 
with predominant or large Muslim populations (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, and Turkey).26 These surveys provide considerable variation in terms of 
the average income, the type of political system and the structure of the national 
economies, among other country-level variables.
The US survey is “Fortune Magazine Poll # 2008-4311: Economy,” which was 
fielded in 2008 by Abt – Schulman, Ronca & Bucuvalas, Incorporated (SRBI).27 
The survey sought to examine the attitudes of 1000 randomly-selected individu-
als toward the US economy and related issues in the first year of the worldwide 
economic crisis.
The second survey was administered in countries with predominantly or 
large Muslim populations in early 2008 by www.worldpublicopinion.org, which 
is a collaborative project involving research centers from around the world and 
managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the Univer-
sity of Maryland.28 The original survey sought the opinions of a random sample 
of more than 5000 individuals in eight countries about globalization and related 
issues including international trade. Four of the five survey countries are among 
the top 10 countries in the world with the largest Muslim populations (all but 
Azerbaijan).
Note that we are not attempting to integrate the findings from the analyses of 
the two surveys. We fully recognize that they are not readily comparable in such a 
direct fashion because of the different contexts of survey implementation and the 
different questions. However, we argue that there is inherent value in looking at 
the broader pattern of findings to determine if the effects are broadly consistent 
with theoretical constructs.
26 The broader Muslim-country survey also included Great Britain, Iran, and Palestine, but 
questions about trade were excluded entirely for Great Britain and Iran, and basic demographic 
variables were excluded for Palestine. Where possible, we run alternative analyses in order to 
include Palestine, and consistently; these results are similar to those presented in this research.
27 Fortune Magazine (2008).
28 World Public Opinion (2008).
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3.2  Dependent variables
As the survey data permit, we seek to use dependent variables that examine both 
trade policy attitudes generally and individuals’ attitudes toward trade’s major 
effects, including on jobs, mobility, economic pocketbook issues, macroeco-
nomic performance and consumption. While the precise questions vary, there is 
sufficient continuity across the two surveys to generate a meaningful discussion 
comparing the results (see Data Appendix A for the wording of each question).
In the US survey, the dependent variables are direct queries about attitudes 
on trade generally, and its effects on the respondent personally, workers, busi-
ness and consumption. Though three responses are possible, for reasons of data 
analysis and more intuitive presentation of results, we have re-coded the variable 
dichotomously wherein a “1” indicates support for free trade.
The questions in the survey of Muslim countries tap into several of the same 
conceptual issues as the other survey, and include trade generally and trade’s 
effects on consumption, job security, job creation, standard of living and domes-
tic business. There is one additional question about trade’s effects on the envi-
ronment that is difficult to place directly in this research’s broader theoretical 
discussion but which we include as a robustness and stability check for the sig-
nificance and direction of the coefficients of the variables included in the other 
analyses. The possible answers to all of these questions are dichotomous: “good” 
(1) or “bad” (0).
3.3  Independent variables
Considering the theoretical inquiry of this research, the first independent vari-
able is gender. Following most research, it is a dummy variable where “female” 
is set to 1. Drawing from the general literature on trade attitudes, other key vari-
ables include: education; age; income; prospective economic outlook; and ideol-
ogy and/or political party. Where data permit and there is compelling theoretical 
logic and/or strong precedent in the literature, we include several other controls 
in some analyses.
The second major independent variable most relevant to this theoretical 
inquiry, education, is a very complex variable in the trade attitudes literature 
and, as discussed above, is often poorly developed theoretically. Scholars use it 
to represent mobility by identifying if an individual is part of the abundant factor, 
the level of individual human capital, and “knowledge” about trade and related 
economic issues.
DEGRUYTER 
The puzzle of heterogeneity in support for free trade      465
In this research, it is particularly important theoretically to understand how 
gender and education interact, and if there are distinct patterns across different 
types of countries. Accordingly, in order to generate a meaningful interaction, we 
first dichotomize education into college graduate and those who are not college 
graduates. Hainmueller and Hiscox present empirical data supporting the con-
tention that college education – more than any other type of education – has 
a measurable and significant effect on support for free trade.29 We then create 
an interaction between the two dummy variables: college graduate and female. 
In addition, in contrast to using the ordered education variable in the interac-
tion term, generating an interaction of gender and the dichotomous education 
variable permits more meaningful interpretations of the constituent terms. The 
female constituent term represents women who are not college graduates, while 
the college graduate constituent term represents males with college degrees.
Age is often linked by scholars to aspects of broader adaptability in the work-
force. In particular, scholars suggest that older people are more typically less able 
or perhaps less willing to relocate, so policies such as liberalizing trade that can 
have implications for dislocating workers are often less popular with them. In 
each dataset, age is a continuous measure by year.
Like education, income is also often poorly developed theoretically. High 
incomes can indicate some level of adaptability or flexibility, or perhaps even pro-
pensity for risk. High incomes can also indicate more consumptive power. Income 
is also usually highly correlated (and/or causally related) to education, so it is not 
easy to disentangle these complexities. In any event, it is positively related to atti-
tudes toward open trade and statistically significant in most research. In terms 
of measurement across the surveys, though the actual increments are different, 
the measures are conceptually similar. The US survey uses a seven-point scale: 
1 represents respondents reporting income  < $20,000; 2 = $20,000 to just under 
$35,000; 3 = $35,000 to just under $50,000; 4 = $50,000 to just under $75,000; 
5 = $75,000 to just under $100,000; 6 = $100,000 to just under $150,000; and 
7 = $150,000 or more. In the Muslim-country survey, using specific scales for each 
country relative to cost of living, the surveyors use a three-point income scale of 
low, medium and high, which we code from 1 to 3, respectively.
Studies have found a consistent positive relationship between broader mac-
roeconomic outlook and attitudes toward open trade.30 Though theoretically it is 
challenging to disentangle this notion from mobility and/or economic security 
distinctly (and from several of the dependent variables, too), it appears likely 
29 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
30 See particularly Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
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that many citizens consider the broader economy and link those perceptions to 
the policies that may be affecting it, including trade policy. In the US survey, the 
question is a short-term prospective, one in which the survey asks if the economy 
is “getting better” (coded 1), staying the same (0), or getting worse (–1).” Unfortu-
nately, there are no sociotropic questions asked in the Muslim-country data, nor 
any questions that could serve as a reasonable proxy.
Though it has been much less consistently demonstrated in the empiri-
cal research, Kaltenthaler et  al. posit that attitudes toward trade policy are 
shaped by more of a personal economic interest or “pocketbook” concerns.31 
Again, only the US survey asks a pocketbook economic question: Just think-
ing about your own personal economic situation, do you feel that over the past 
12 months things have gotten better (coded as 1), worse (–1), or stayed about 
the same (0)?
Some researchers have posited a strong link between ideology and atti-
tudes toward trade. But once again, the theoretical logic is far from clear. On 
the one hand, from the viewpoint of a mobile factors approach, political parties 
that are supported largely by the abundant labor factor should have support-
ers that are in favor of more open trade. In developed countries, these parties 
should be right-leaning and supported by capital and higher-skilled citizens, 
and in developing countries, these parties should be left-leaning and supported 
by lower-skilled labor.32 The US survey offers data on political party affiliation 
and ideology, and we code the political party variable on a five-point scale with 
strong Democrat coded to 1, a leans-Democrat coded as 2, an independent that 
reports no leaning to either party as 3, a leans-Republican as 4 and a strong 
Republican coded as 5.33
In order to examine preliminarily the trade knowledge hypothesis using the 
US survey data, we include a measure of self-identified trade knowledge.34 Of 
course, whether the respondent is qualified to assess his or her own knowledge of 
trade is a separate but important issue; in effect, in many cases, it is more likely a 
measure of individual-level issue salience than actual knowledge. In either event, 
31 Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli (2004).
32 While this dynamic seems to hold well in analyses of trade openness in developed countries, 
scholars have found more support for openness in some developing countries from right- leaning 
parties (e.g., Magaloni and Romero 2008) or a near convergence in support for more open  policies 
between the left and right (e.g., Armijo and Faucher 2002; Kingstone and Young 2009).
33 A separate question in the survey asks respondents if they self-identify as liberals or con-
servatives. We use this measure as an alternative, and it produces substantively similar results to 
the political party variable.
34 See Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
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we argue that it is a useful control. The question asks: On another topic, compared 
to most other issues in the news, how closely do you follow news about US trade 
with foreign countries – very closely (3), somewhat closely (2), not very closely (1), 
or not at all (0)?
Lastly, scholars have posited that religion might affect outlook on economic 
liberalization. Briefly, researchers posit that some religious-based social move-
ments are skeptical of modernization and/or strong policies that they conceptual-
ize as secular.35 Only the Muslim-country survey asks a religion question and it is 
limited to Muslim (coded “1”) and non-Muslim (“0”).
3.4  Methodology
The dichotomous nature of the responses suggests the use of logistic regression.36 
As a general check on the robustness of the results, we also re-run the models 
using probit analysis. The results do not change substantively from the logistic 
regression results. The results for the US are given in Table 1. 
Because country-level traits might affect the results, we include country 
dummies in the analysis of the multi-country survey results. It is possible that 
specific characteristics of certain countries affect the results, but without more 
countries to establish a sample at this higher level of analysis, it is not possi-
ble to control meaningfully for these possibilities. In an ideal scenario, a hier-
archical model a la Baker would be utilized, but under the constraints of the 
data – specifically, too few countries – the best alternative is the use of a set of 
country dummies.37 The important issue when choosing the baseline country is 
a sufficient sample size: you do not want the baseline sample to be small. Since 
the country samples are similar in size it does not matter in this regard which 
country we choose. Some scholars propose using the most “average” case though 
the selection conceptually is mostly arbitrary. We present results in Table 2 using 
Nigeria as the baseline, but it has no substantive effect on the results which 
country we use.
35 See Daniels and von der Ruhr (2005).
36 We run the models for the US using the original three-point scale in both ordered logistic and 
probit regressions and these models produce substantively similar results to the regular logit and 
probit models in terms of direction, size and strength of the coefficients.
37 Baker (2005, 2009).
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Table 1 Logistic regression of individual attitudes toward International trade and its effects in 
the US, 2008.
  General   Consumer   Workers   Business   Personal
Female   –0.40*   –0.58**   –0.83**   –0.58**   –0.54**
  (0.19)   (0.19)   (0.29)   (0.20)   (0.21)
College graduate   0.27   0.26   –0.09   0.12   0.43*
  (0.22)   (0.21)   (0.27)   (0.21)   (0.22)
Female*College graduate   0.19   0.57*   0.90**   0.37   0.19
  (0.32)   (0.29)   (0.41)   (0.29)   (0.31)
Income   0.13*   0.18**   –0.007   0.07   0.09*
  (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.05)
Age   –0.08*   –0.13**   –0.14**   –0.02   –0.12**
  (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.04)
Party   0.009   0.09   0.09   0.22   –0.09
  (0.17)   (0.16)   (0.21)   (0.16)   (0.16)
Pocketbook economic   0.18   0.33**   0.37**   0.30**   0.39**
  (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.16)   (0.11)   (0.12)
Prospective sociotropic outlook   0.76**   0.36**   0.62**   0.39**   0.40**
  (0.15)   (0.14)   (0.17)   (0.14)   (0.15)
Trade knowledge   0.002   –0.09   –0.03   0.11   –0.07
  (0.10)   (0.09)   (0.12)   (0.09)   (0.09)
Constant   –0.46   0.51   –0.34   –0.25   0.18
  (0.35)   (0.33)   (0.41)   (0.32)   (0.34)
Observations+   852   865   872   864   836
Standard errors in parentheses. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
+The number of observations varies because not all respondents answered every trade 
question.
4  Results and discussion
The findings from the empirical analyses of the two surveys reveal preliminary 
evidence that a mobile factors-inspired theoretical argument to explain gender 
differences in the perceptions of trade policy is, at a minimum, a reasonable 
starting point for explaining the results in the US survey, though much less 
so for the survey in the five developing countries. Partly consistent with the 
predictions of this research’s theoretical framework, the results demonstrate 
that there are sometimes important differences in how gender affects attitudes 
toward trade among those respondents from the developed country and the 
developing countries in these analyses. In brief, in the US, we find that col-
lege-educated women tend to perceive the effects of international trade more 
positively than women without college degrees, though college educated-
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Table 2 Logistic regression of individual attitudes toward International trade and its effects in 
five predominantly muslim countries, 2007.
  Consumption   Economic security   Other
  Trade   Consumer   Job 
security
  Job 
creation
  Standard 
of living
  Domestic 
business
  Environ-
ment
Female   0.11   0.09   0.02   0.06   0.07   0.31**   0.11
  (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.09)   (0.08)
College graduate   0.59**   0.14   0.22   0.34*   0.26   0.57**   0.25
  (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.15)   (0.15)   (0.16)   (0.16)   (0.14)
Female*College 
graduate
  –0.42+   –0.12   0.09   –0.04   0.13   –0.45+   0.03
  (0.24)   (0.24)   (0.23)   (0.23)   (0.24)   (0.24)   (0.22)
Age   0.004   0.01   0.01*   0.002   0.003   0.04   0.01**
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)
Income   0.12*   0.13*   0.03   0.06   0.13*   –0.01   –0.005
  (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.05)
Muslim   –0.59**   –0.18   –0.81**   –0.62**   –0.52**   –0.86**   –0.61**
  (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.10)
Constant   0.46**   0.93**   0.02   0.20   0.49**   0.37*   –0.07
  (0.17)   (0.18)   (0.17)   (0.17)   (0.17)   (0.17)   (0.16)
N of Obs   3341   3186   3107   3266   3099   3269   3152
Standard errors in parentheses. **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, +p < 0.10.
women do appear to support it on average not much differently than their 
male counterparts with or without a college degree. In contrast, in developing 
countries, the results of the multivariate analyses – though much less statisti-
cally significant than the US analyses – suggest preliminarily a rather differ-
ent scenario. College-educated men were the most likely to support economic 
openness. Women were a little less likely to support free trade, with very little 
discernible gap between college-educated and non-college educated. The most 
pronounced gap was with men without a college degree, who were notably 
less likely than the other three groups to support economic openness. With the 
caveat that the statistical significances were very weak or often non-existent, 
this finding does not augur well for a gender/mobile factors approach for these 
developing countries.
With binary logit models with interactive terms, a more meaningful inter-
pretation of the results requires some additional empirical effort. Accordingly, 
following Mitchell and Chen, we graph the results so we can better understand 
the substance of the results – in this case, to visualize the different propensities 
to support open trade of the discrete groups of interest generated by interacting 
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the gender and college-educated variables.38 The vital benefit of such a technique 
is that it incorporates the contributions of the covariates when we use predicted 
probabilities to interpret the broader effects. We also argue that it is a particularly 
intuitive way to examine the data. For both the sake of simplicity of presentation 
and, more importantly, because the patterns are remarkably consistent across 
the different dependent variables within the results for each survey, we present 
only one graph (i.e., one “sample” dependent variable) for the results from each 
survey/table.
In Figure 1, we observe that the predicted probability of college-educated 
men and women to believe that international trade benefits consumers is about 
equal at slightly  < 0.6. Their male peers without college degrees are only margin-
ally less likely to share this belief. Women without a college degree, however, 
are much less likely to think that trade is good for consumers (almost 0.3). This 
result bears out consistently in a statistically significant manner across the differ-
ent components of free trade that we test, suggesting a robust finding. The one 
small difference that we note is a shift downward of all of the probabilities with 
the question about “workers” – the probabilities across all four groups are much 
lower ( < 0.3) though very much in the same overall pattern visible in Figure 1.
Arguably, if we consider a more “pure” mobile factors approach, the positive 
finding for less-educated males is puzzling. If anything, the anecdotal evidence 
– the peer-reviewed literature is so far relatively sparse – suggests that steady 
decreases in manufacturing in the US have particularly hurt male workers who 
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Figure 1 “International trade… is good for consumers in the US” – Visualization of main effects 
and interactions of gender and college education.
38 Mitchell and Chen (2005).
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are not college-educated.39 Perhaps a plausible explanation for this discrepancy 
lies in the risk-focused literature discussed above, which suggests that men have 
a larger appetite for risk, including new economic policies. However, the prelimi-
nary results below from the five developing countries cast some doubt on the 
contention that men are generally more risk-tolerant. We do not have a good 
explanation for this finding and it suggests a path for future research.
On a related note, a mobile factors approach assumes full employment. While 
it is reasonable to argue that women are concerned about wage levels, it is likely 
that they also have grave direct concerns about their employment status – i.e., 
job or no job – and concerns well beyond the individual level. The results from 
these analyses clearly bear out women’s broad concerns about trade liberaliza-
tion. These more comprehensive interpretations, however, are not well accounted 
for theoretically in a strict mobile factors approach, so it seems reasonable to con-
sider relaxing this assumption to allow for these concerns.
Finally, the graphical representation in Figure 1 strongly suggests that the 
consistent negative general finding for gender across many studies may be driven 
in considerable part by women with less education in developed countries. The 
negative and significant coefficient that scholars have observed in many of the 
studies may be missing the fact that it really depends on the key characteristic of 
women. Thus, the “median” woman might have a more negative outlook toward 
free trade but it hardly tells the whole story.
The graphical representation in Figure 2 tells a different story for these five 
developing countries. In this figure, we see that college educated men are the 
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Figure 2 “International trade is good for companies…” – Visualization of main effects and 
interactions of gender and college education in five developing countries.
39 For example, “Decline of the working man: why ever fewer low-skilled American men have 
jobs,” Economist, 28 April 2011.
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most likely to be positive toward international trade, while college-educated 
women are the next most likely group to support it, followed closely by women 
without college degrees, and lastly men without college degrees. Note, however, 
that the spread amongst these groups is much tighter than we observe in Figure 1 
for the US. Also, note that both lines are well above the 0.5 mark, suggesting that 
all individuals in all four groups are more likely to be positive toward interna-
tional trade than not. These patterns repeat across the other five analyses that 
examine effects of international trade on consumption, job creation, job security, 
standard of living and environment. This finding is in marked contrast to the US 
where overall support across the components of free trade is simply lower, which 
begs for more analytical attention in future surveys and corresponding research.
Considering that neither gender nor the interaction between gender and edu-
cation is significant in most of these analyses, we have to consider these results 
very cautiously. This finding of little or no effect might suggests that there is a 
less strong gendered component to trade attitudes in these five developing coun-
tries with large or predominant Muslim populations. More research is necessary 
to explain meaningfully why there are more limited effects of gender, especially 
compared to the US, and also to determine if this is a pattern across other devel-
oping countries and regions.
4.1  Consumption
The finding from the US survey that educated women are more likely than their 
non-college educated female counterparts to state that they believe that free trade 
is positive for consumers is puzzling in light of the existing research. This finding 
is not consistent with Hall et al.’s theoretical supposition about perceptions of 
how women link tariffs and price.40 The evidence in this US survey suggests that 
is rather uncertain that all women share this viewpoint.
4.2  Education and/or knowledge
The divergent results between the US and developing countries in these surveys 
suggest that scholars need to pay closer attention to issues of education and 
knowledge. While this research finds generally what Burgoon and Hiscox41 and 
40 Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998).
41 Burgoon and Hiscox (2004).
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Hainmueller and Hiscox42 find – that educated people in the US, and perhaps 
especially educated women, have more positive viewpoints toward open trade – 
the finding that men without college education do not differ markedly cast some 
doubt on both the human capital and knowledge arguments. In developing coun-
tries, there simply is not much statistically significant variation among these 
groups. If the human capital hypothesis were valid, we would not likely observe 
that, e.g., women without college degrees hold similar views toward interna-
tional trade as their educated counterparts.
This research does examine very preliminarily the closely-related issue of trade 
knowledge using the US survey. The coefficients of the trade knowledge variable 
are mixed in direction and are never statistically significant across the five analy-
ses.43 When we generate an interaction of trade knowledge and gender, it does not 
produce results that are statistically significant. Women who follow trade closely do 
not have views statistically different from women who do not follow the topic closely. 
It is possible that many respondents, regardless of gender, do not really understand 
the complexities of international trade, and the survey question that this research 
utilizes is an unreliable measure. However, it is also possible that an individual’s 
actual knowledge of trade does not affect their views of it in any discernible pattern; 
in other words, the distribution of those who are negative or positive toward trade 
openness is comparable no matter the level of knowledge, which is similar to the 
issues discussed directly above. Future surveys need to develop better questions 
that actually test people’s economic and trade knowledge more objectively.
4.3  Risk
As acknowledged above, we cannot effectively test risk-based hypotheses directly 
with these data, but the general trends suggest that risk might be a situation-
specific explanation. If women are more risk-averse naturally, then we should 
observe systematic negative trends in women’s attitudes toward trade across the 
two surveys. These results do not bear out such a consistency. Similarly, as dis-
cussed above, there is possibly a divergence among men, too, with preliminary 
evidence that men without a college degree in these developing countries are the 
least supportive of international trade. Considering the complexity of the relation-
ship between risk and trade attitudes, a next logical step in terms of testing these 
potential explanations might include more work in the experimental laboratory.
42 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
43 Removing the knowledge variable from the analysis does not change any other result sub-
stantively.
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5  Alternative explanations
While the results for many of the control variables vary among the analyses 
depending on the survey and the particular dependent variable, there are some 
consistent findings of theoretical note. One of the most stable findings using the 
US survey is the direction and significance of the coefficients for prospective eco-
nomic outlook variable: in nearly every analysis, the coefficients of this variable 
are positive and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with Mansfield 
and Mutz’s finding across two national surveys in the US.44 If a respondent is opti-
mistic about the nation’s economic prospects, they are much likelier to support 
international trade generally, or to think that it has positive effects on specific 
facets of the economy (e.g., consumption, mobility, macroeconomic, etc.).
There are, however, potential problematic issues with sociotropic variables 
that scholars sometimes do not acknowledge sufficiently. Undoubtedly, there is 
genuine potential for tautology because the crude logic suggests that (dis)satis-
faction with the economy leads to (dis)satisfaction with a major component of 
the economy – i.e., trade. On a closely related note, it is difficult to know whether 
sociotropic issues belong on the left- or the right-hand side of the empirical equa-
tions. There is a reasonable case for both and scholars should consider these 
issues more carefully.
In the Muslim-country survey, the coefficients of the Muslim dummy variable 
are negative and statistically significant in six of the seven analyses (not the con-
sumer dependent variable), suggesting that Muslim respondents are much less 
likely to support trade generally or to think that it has positive impacts on any 
major aspect such as jobs or the macro-economy. There could be myriad explana-
tions for this finding and it deserves considerably more investigation in future 
research, particularly considering the general conclusion of the surveyors that 
Muslims are generally supportive of globalization, which was based on aggre-
gated responses not on multivariate analysis with appropriate controls.45
Age demonstrates an unanticipated divergence between the two surveys 
in terms of the direction and consistency of the statistical significances of the 
coefficients. As with many other empirical studies, the findings for age in the US 
survey suggest a negative relationship: older people are less likely to be support-
ive of free trade or to believe that it has widespread positive effects. In all analyses 
for the US, the coefficients for age are negative, and in four of the five analyses, 
they are statistically significant. In the Muslim-country survey, age is positive 
in all analyses, though only significant with the job security and environment 
44 Mansfield and Mutz (2009).
45 See, World Public Opinion (2008).
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dependent variables, and the magnitude of effect is small. It is possible that in 
many developing countries, older people recall the long-term economic chal-
lenges associated with closed economies, though new survey data would be nec-
essary to address this issue effectively.
As discussed above, across the analyses, income is fairly consistently posi-
tive and significant at the 5% level in nearly half the analyses. Respondents with 
higher incomes are more likely to deem international trade as good generally, or 
positive for specific aspects of their lives or for their country. Again, income is 
easily conflated with other variables in the analysis, especially education, and 
scholars must continue to consider these complexities.
Political party is not a strong predictor of attitudes toward trade policies in 
the US. The coefficients of the political party variables are never statistically sig-
nificant and are inconsistent in terms of direction. This finding might have to do 
with the broad umbrella of diverse groups that each of the two major parties has 
become, wherein support for trade varies greatly among these groups.
6  Conclusions
By using an original analytical approach that focuses not just on general atti-
tudes toward free or international trade, but for the first time on a significant 
scale, on attitudes toward the issues and components of free/international trade 
and its effects, this research generates some valuable theoretical insight into and 
empirical illustrations of how gender may be affecting preferences toward trade 
policies. The evidence suggests that a mobile factors/economic security approach 
helps us to understand better how gender is affecting trade policy attitudes in 
the US. Women who perceive that they are more economically secure or perhaps 
observe better economic prospects – at least in the face of trade policy change – 
tend to be more sanguine about trade liberalization. In contrast, women who find 
themselves in more vulnerable economic positions are more skeptical about poli-
cies of freer trade. Considering that the preponderance of research on trade atti-
tudes includes only developed countries and finds a consistently negative gender 
effect, this very robust finding for the US is enormously important. Moreover, 
these findings are robust to trade’s broader economic effects – similar patterns 
clearly emerge across multiple facets of trade. While scholars must do more work 
to test these relationships, empirical evidence supporting broader mobile factors 
of trade attitudes explanations may be partly driven by gender.
The “non-” findings for the gender-education interaction in the developing 
country survey clearly suggests that the broader explanation is complex. These 
findings do not support well the gender/mobile factors framework. If this were 
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the case, we would observe much weaker support from college-educated women 
in these countries. The findings also cast some doubt on the human capital 
argument: less education does not necessarily automatically translate into less 
support for economic liberalization. Scholars need to dissect the specific com-
ponents of the overall explanations and corresponding theoretical frameworks 
better. In particular, in most research, the mobility, human capital, knowledge 
and ideas components are not sufficiently distinct. In terms of a mobile factors 
approach, it is quite likely that our old definitions of “scarce” and “abundant” 
factors are much less meaningful in this highly globalized world, particularly in 
rapidly-growing middle-income countries such as Turkey. To examine better the 
knowledge and ideas arguments, scholars need to probe the individual’s techni-
cal background and preconceptions about principles of trade more objectively, 
not only by testing their economic and trade knowledge, but also by determining 
better what is being taught in universities or other educational venues concerning 
trade, and how the media are presenting these issues in each country.
The theoretical implications of these findings demand further testing of the eco-
nomic security-focused propositions in new and different contexts. This research 
generates compelling results from analyses using public opinion data from the US, 
but it is clear that future research needs to test this proposition in other developed 
economies. Similarly, the findings from the survey of five important predominantly-
Muslim countries in Asia and Africa demand that we investigate whether a lack of a 
gender gap exists in other contexts. If these two patterns emerge consistently across 
space (and perhaps time), it is very clear that the research community needs to be 
more innovative in our theoretical thinking. Hopefully, too, more pollsters will ask 
about attitudes toward trade’s effects on multiple relevant aspects and not the blunt, 
much less useful, instrument that has been ubiquitous in previous surveys. Simi-
larly, surveys executed with similar methodologies across multiple, varied countries 
over time would greatly enhance our abilities to infer from these type of data.
With trade policy continuing to be high on both national and international 
agendas, it behooves researchers and policymakers to learn more about how atti-
tudes and preferences develop. A recent major event in Latin America demon-
strates the importance of developing a better understanding of individual-level 
trade attitudes. The 2007 referendum in Costa Rica on the ratification of a free 
trade agreement among the Central American countries, the US and the Domini-
can Republic only narrowly passed and public opinion polls suggest that men 
were slightly more likely to support the pact than women.46 With such a close 
46 Surveys from both the Universidad de Costa Rica’s (UCR) Escuela de Estadistica and Centro 
de Estudios de Opinion immediately after the referendum and Latin American Public Opinion 
Project in early 2008 suggest this result.
DEGRUYTER 
The puzzle of heterogeneity in support for free trade      477
vote, for either the “yes” or the “no” side, the disproportionate preferences of spe-
cific major discrete groups, such as those defined by gender and/or education, 
may well have played a role in the final outcome. Across time and space, there 
continues to be some evidence of a gender component to differences in these 
individual-level trade policy preferences and this research takes important steps 
toward parsing out some of the explanations of this phenomenon.
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Appendix A – Survey questions
US Survey
The general question reads:
1.  As you may know, international trade has increased a great deal in recent 
years. Do you think that the growth in international trade has made things 
better or made things worse for the US as a whole?
The trade effects questions use the same root as the general question, but replace 
the underlined with the following:
2. … for you personally?
3. … for American workers?
4. … for American business?
5. … for consumers in the US?
Muslim-Country Survey
1. Do you think international trade is good or bad for creating jobs in [country]?
2.  Do you think international trade is good or bad for job security for [country] 
workers?
3.  Do you think international trade is good or bad for [country] economy?
4. Do you think international trade is good or bad for[country] companies?
5.  Do you think international trade is good or bad for your own standard of 
living?
6. Do you think international trade is good or bad for consumers like you?
7. Do you think international trade is good or bad for the environment?
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